I’ve been toying with a new argument for this conclusion: fundamental reality is mental stuff. This idea builds upon my work on counting arguments in the philosophy of mind. I’d like to share the skeleton of that argument here.
Here’s an AI summary:
I. The Counting Argument for Mind-First Stuff
Here are the bones of the argument:
The most fundamental reality is the basis of the most stuff.
Mind is the basis of more stuff than anything else.
Therefore, the most fundamental reality is mind.
I begin by defining key terms. The term “stuff” is a technical term that philosophers use to denote something that can be divided or partitioned perpetually without limit. Imagine, for example, some perfectly continuous clay, which could (in principle) be divided into smaller and smaller pieces. This clay would count as “stuff.”
We can conceive of something having more stuff than something else because there are different types of infinity that could measure the number of divisions of the respective kinds of stuff. For example, continuous clay is divisible into Aleph2 sets of points (assuming the continuum hypothesis). But if each set of points defines a shape, then we could define an abstract, mathematical landscape in terms of sets of shapes, and this abstract landscape is divisible into Aleph3 sets of shapes. In this respect, the abstract landscape has more stuff than the clay.
In light of these definitions, my basic idea is that mind is the basis of the most stuff and is—for reasons I will articulate—the most fundamental reality.
II. Fundamental Reality is the Basis of the Most Stuff
The first part of my argument is about the structure of reality (and could be of interest to philosophers wholly apart from any applications in the philosophy of mind). I suggest that the most fundamental reality would be the basis of the most stuff.
Why think this? Two reasons initially come to my mind. First, we get a simpler theory of reality if we can explain everything ultimately in terms of a single kind of stuff. To illustrate, suppose the fundamental reality is matter. And suppose we could explain everything else in terms of this matter (e.g., water is a form of matter, ice is a form of water, etc.), then we have a simpler theory than if we must posit multiple basic kinds of reality. The basic idea here is that if fundamental reality consists of a single kind of reality from which all other realities can be made, then fundamental reality is the basis of the most stuff (since everything is based in it), and this result gives us a simpler theory of reality.
A second reason, perhaps, to think that fundamental reality is the basis of the most stuff is from an intuition that more stuff cannot come from less stuff. Consider, by contrast, the theory that fundamental reality is a single indivisible particle. It might seem strange (counter-intuitive) to suppose that this particle could create some infinitely divisible clay. It is more plausible, one might think, that an infinitely divisible reality (like clay) could only be formed out of a more fundamental, infinitely divisible reality.
A clarification is in order: stuff can be divisible with respect to different properties. For example, suppose God is not divisible with respect to a spatial properties (e.g., you cannot cut God in half). God could still be divisible with respect to another property—e.g., God’s powers to form mental images. We could imagine, for example, that God could make mental images of objects of any size or shape, and that God therefore contains a lot of mental stuff, even if God does not contain a lot of spatial stuff (apart from the spatial stuff that is part of mental imagery…). This distinction allows us to recognize that something could be considered to contain different “stuff” relative to different properties.
I want to think more about possible reasons one might think the more fundamental reality is a basis for more stuff. It seems intuitive, but more work on this section could help clarify what’s at stake.
III. Mind is the Basis of More Stuff than Anything Else
Here is where the counting arguments come in. A counting argument compares the number of possible mental states with other possible states. I will argue that mind is a basis of the most possible states.
Consider, first, that mind is the basis of all possible mental realities, which include thoughts, mental images, stories, intentions, agreements, songs, and anything else that could occur within consciousness.
From here, we can argue that the space of possible mental realities includes the space of possible non-mental realities. Here is how. Take any hypothetical non-mental reality R, whether a pebble or a particle. We can now define a possible mental reality in terms of R: for example, there is a mental representation of R (e.g., an image of a pebble). This implies that there are at least as many possible mental realities as possible non-mental realities. (Note: the notion of “possible” here is logical possibility—i.e., consistency with reason.)
Next, we can identify additional mental realities by using conceptual relations to combine mental representations of non-mental realities. For example, we can combine an image of a shoe with an image of a bear to form a mental reality of a thought about both images (e.g., thinking that the image of the bear or the image of the shoe is lovely). By cantor’s theorem, it follows that there are more possible mental realities than possible non-mental realities. (For more details on this deduction, see my article, “Building Thoughts From Dust.”)
Thus, we have shown that there are more possible mental realities than mindless realities. Therefore, a mental foundation of reality is a basis of more possible realities than is a mindless foundation.
IV. Implication
From the previous sections, it follows that the most fundamental reality is mind.
Recap. Fundamental reality is the basis of the most possible realities (per the arguments from simplicity and from greater stuff). Mind is the basis of more possible realities than the mindless (per the counting argument). Hence, mind is the most fundamental reality.
V. Objections
What are some objections or questions that someone might have?
Just curious, but what did you think about this guy who wrote on your argument?
https://authortomharper.com/2023/12/14/consciousness-the-brain-and-the-counting-problem/
I would have to think about this in more detail, but on first glance it seems like there is some equivocation going on.
What is your definition of "basis?" The first sentence, "The most fundamental reality is the basis of the most stuff" sounds like a reasonable proposition -- sure, you think, the "base layer" of what things are made of is the "fundamental reality", it is also what "makes up" most things -- but you are primed to be thinking in terms of material objects that comprise other objects.
But then comes the second premise, "Mind is the basis of more stuff than anything else." Hmmm? You switch to a more abstract definition of "basis" that you flesh out in the second section, but if I had known this was what definition you had in mind, I wouldn't have agreed to the first premise in the first case.