How Reasoning Arises

A Causal Exclusion Argument for a Fundamental Mind

This is an early draft of my forthcoming article in Arguments from Reason and Libertarian Freedom, edited by Tim Stratton and Joshua Farris. It is shared here exclusively for members of the Worldview Design Studio for the purpose of private reading and constructive feedback while I revise the manuscript.

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Abstract

I develop a new “causal exclusion” argument for a mind-first theory of reality. The argument begins with the existence of reasoning and investigates the kinds of underlying causes that could allow for reasoning to take place. Specifically, I draw out a causal exclusion problem for a purely mindless explanation of reasoning. While the causal exclusion problem has been raised against certain dualist theories in the philosophy of mind, I argue that a deeper exclusion problem arises for any “mindless-first” theory that posits mindless stuff prior to all mental activity. I consider possible solutions to this exclusion problem and show why many physicalist strategies do not pull out the root problem. I then show how a mind-first theory can solve the problem in a deep way. According to this analysis, our power to reason is grounded ultimately, not in mindless motions, but in a fundamentally mental order.

Keywords

causal exclusion problem, mental causation, mental causation, mind‑first theory, materialism, argument from reason

1. Introduction

You can think. But how? How is any thinking possible? If the basic ingredients of reality are entirely mindless, operating only by impersonal laws, how could genuine thinking ever arise, anywhere?

This question is significant for several reasons. First, attempts to explain the existence of thinking has proven challenging. While thinking is familiar, its existence is far from trivial. It is not immediately obvious how thinking could arise out of a sea of moving particles or what fundamental ingredients are required. Some philosophers have argued that the existence of thinking cannot be explained and that therefore genuine thinking is not actually real. For example, the philosopher of science, Alexander Rosenburg argues that no clump of matter could be about another clump of matter, and that therefore, thoughts do not exist (Rosenberg 2011, 173-74). Skepticism about the existence of thinking is a sign of the challenge to explain its existence. Different theories of reality offer different materials for an explanation, yet each faces distinctive challenges. Seeing these challenges can help us appreciate the significance of the very existence of thinking.

Second, insight into how thinking arises can also provide insight into our own nature as thinking beings. If, for example, thought arises from mindless motions of matter, then our rational life is an echo of non-mental, non-rational states. If, on the other hand, thought cannot arise from mindless motions alone, then either we don’t really think (as some philosophers have proposed) or our thinking points to a deeper, mental reality within us. In that case, every act of understanding—every grasp of truth—is a reflection of something beyond mechanical motions. This result has implications for understanding artificial intelligence in relation to our intelligence: if we can make a computer simulate thinking, is this simulation itself real thinking or a device for extending thinking within us? Answers to this question depend on a general theory of how thinking arises.

Third, thinking is itself a window into the structure of reality. The existence of thinking does not merely have implications for our self-understanding; it also has implications for what reality must be like most fundamentally. That’s because different theories of fundamental imply different resources for explaining the emergence of thinking. A better understanding of how thinking can exist can therefore help us better understand fundamental reality itself.

My aim here is to consider which general theory of reality can best explain the existence of thinking—and, in particular, the sequence of thoughts we call “reasoning.” Three broad options stand out. First, the mind-first theory holds that reasoning ultimately arises from some fundamental form of mind. Second, the mindless-first theory maintains that reasoning emerges from processes—such as neural firings or atomic motions—that are themselves non-mental. Finally, the eliminativist theory denies that genuine thinking or reasoning exists at all.

To explore what is at stake in these theories, I will present a causal exclusion argument for a mind-first theory. Specifically, I will argue that the existence and efficacy of reasoning—our capacity to grasp and follow a logical progression of thoughts—is only possible if reality is not fundamentally mindless. The argument is related to recent work on mental causation (e.g., Mørch 2014; Stoljar 2019; Hashemi 2025; Baysan 2024), except my argument uses an exclusion structure to argue for a fundamental mind. The argument bears a family resemblance to “arguments from reason” in the tradition of C. S. Lewis, while it builds upon contemporary debates about causal exclusion and mental causation.

To proceed, I will first unpack why reasoning is puzzling on a purely materialist, mindless-first paradigm, highlighting a problem of causal exclusion. Next, I will develop a mind-first theory that resolves this puzzle by explaining how reasoning could arise from mentality at the foundation of reality. Third, I will consider a range of objections to this argument and offer replies. Finally, I will conclude with some reflections on the significance of this kind of argument and its utility for further exploration.

2. The Problem of Reasoning

The existence of a “reasonable” sequence of thoughts presents two related puzzles. The first is the puzzle of what thought is—its nature. A thought has remarkable features: it can be about something; it can be true or false; it can combine with other thoughts through logical links such as and, or, and if and only if; and it can divide into more basic concepts. For each of these features, we can ask how that feature might be explained in terms of more fundamental, physical features, like motion or shape. For example, how could the mere motion or shape of molecules ever amount to something being about something else? To explain the nature of thought, we must probe the nature of its most basic causes. I’ll call this the Category Challenge—the challenge of explaining how the very category of thinking could exist at all. The Category Challenge is a specific case of the so-called “hard” problem of explaining consciousness.

Second, there is the challenge of explaining the power of thought—its ability to make a difference. Consider an ordinary example: you think about what you might do today. That act of thinking seems to influence what you think next and even what you end up doing. But how does this happen? If your thoughts are entirely determined by the motions of molecules in your brain, how could those molecular motions explain another thought or direct your actions in a purposeful way? The puzzle here is about how mindless motions could align with the meaningful content of a mental state.

To illustrate this puzzle, suppose you think you will buy eggs later tonight. This thought has a particular content: that you will buy eggs later tonight. If you do buy eggs later tonight, the match between thought and reality suggests that the content of your thought played a causal role in your behavior. How does that work? Consider that if your thoughts are themselves grounded entirely in mindless motions, then the motions will need to add up to a sequence of events that matches the conceptual content of a thought. But how could that happen? What explains this match between thought and reality? More fundamentally, how could a thought’s conceptual content be a driving force for making any real differences in reality?

To better grasp this second challenge, consider an analogy. Imagine a floor covered with marbles. Each marble moves solely because of impacts from other marbles, all following fixed physical laws. Every motion on the floor can be exhaustively explained by these local collisions. Now suppose someone adds that, beyond these collisions, the marbles’ motions are also guided by invisible thoughts beneath the floor, and suppose the marbles roll into a configuration that displays a message, “we are alive.”

This additional story is puzzling. If the complete physical story already accounts for every trajectory and velocity of every marble, there is no causal work left for invisible thoughts to do. Their influence would be causally excluded by the completeness of the physical explanation. How, then, does the message arise? The problem here is that the mindless motions causally exclude the mental.

In the same way, if every mental event is wholly determined by the underlying motions of particles, then those motions seem to leave no genuine causal role for the contents of our thoughts. Our reasoning, purposes, and insights would be mere reflections of underlying physical processes that, in themselves, lack conceptual content. Such processes might simulate intelligence—just as marbles might accidentally roll into the shape of a sentence—but their motions would not be the reasoning that the sentence expresses. The challenge of explaining how thoughts could make a difference (such as in a chain of reasoning) is what I call “The Causal Challenge”: the challenge is to see how thoughts can affect what happens, whether in one’s mind or in the world.

While both challenges—the Category Challenge and the Causal Challenge—are closely connected, I will focus here on unpacking the Causal Challenge. To help us grapple with this challenge, I will organize the pieces into an argument, which I’ll call the “Causal Exclusion Argument from Reasoning” (CEAR):

1. Realism: Reasoning exists.

2. Causal Efficacy: Reasoning makes a difference.

3. Causal Exclusion: If reasoning exists and makes a difference, then reality cannot be fundamentally mindless.

4. Conclusion: Therefore, reality is not fundamentally mindless.

This argument captures the heart of the Causal Challenge: if our reasoning truly plays a role in shaping what we believe and do, then the foundation of reality must have a place for genuine reasoning power.

Let us take a closer look at the motivations behind each premise. My aim here is not to offer a full defense of the argument, but rather to provide an initial sense of the challenge it raises. I want to show why someone might find each premise compelling before turning, later, to possible objections.

The first premise expresses realism about reasoning: reasoning exists. Why think that? The most direct reason is conscious awareness. You can be immediately aware of our own reasoning as it unfolds in your own minds. For example, when you weigh evidence or draw a conclusion, you experience a sequence of thoughts joined by logical relations. This sequence of thoughts structured by logical relations is what I call “reasoning.” A reason to think that reasoning exists is direct conscious awareness of reasoning.

This experience of reasoning is part of ordinary experience. Even if you deny the existence of reasoning, you can still be aware of your reliance on reasoning in this very process. For this reason, the realist premise (that reasoning exists) could be thought to rest on the firmest foundation possible—direct awareness of one’s own thinking. (We will return to this premise when considering the objection from illusions.)

Consider premise 2, the causal efficacy premise: reasoning makes a difference. Here I offer two supports. First, we have various evidence of the effects of reasoning. For example, reasoning shapes what we believe and how we act. You might, for instance, revise a plan after realizing that one option better fulfills your goals. Such shifts in thinking follow the logic of reasons. The pattern of cause and effect between one thought and another suggests that reasoning makes a difference.

Building on the first consideration, a second support comes from an epistemological problem with denying the effects of reasoning. Suppose reasoning has no effects. Then none of your beliefs could be based on any reasoning at all. But if no belief is based on reasoning, then you have no rational grounds for believing anything—including the claim that reasoning has no effects. For instance, if you infer that these words have an intelligent source, that inference itself would make no difference to what you believe. Your belief would arise blindly, detached from any rational link. In that case, your belief would lose its claim to be reasonable. This result is general: if reasoning makes no difference, then none of your beliefs are reasonable (based in reason). Yet some of your beliefs are reasonable. Therefore, reasoning must sometimes make a difference. If the reasoning here is persuasive, its persuasive power confirms the point: reasoning can indeed have real effects.

Next is the Causal Exclusion premise: if reasoning is both real and causally effective, then the foundation of thought cannot be purely mindless. We have already glimpsed a motivation for this idea through the marble analogy. Imagine again a world made only of mindless motions and blind interactions. Nothing within such a system would be fundamentally about anything or guided by reasons. Every motion would follow only physical forces, not logical relations. In such a reality, there would be no place for reasoning to do any genuine causal work. If so, then if reasoning truly exists and makes a difference, its ultimate basis cannot be mindless.

If these premises are sound, we arrive at a striking conclusion: reality is not fundamentally mindless. The very phenomenon of reasoning—our capacity to recognize, evaluate, and act upon reasons—points beyond a foundation of blind, reasonless motion. The causal power of thought suggests that some form of mind is at the root of the power to reason. Without an underlying mind, the motions are mindless and random. But randomness does not reveal reasoning.

To explore this idea further, I will consider how a mental framework might account for the existence of reasoning. Then, I will test the causal exclusion argument by examining a series of objections.

3. The Mind-First Solution

I will now provide a mind-first theory of reasoning. The theory is divided into four pillars that together support a deep solution to the causal exclusion problem. Let us have a look at each pillar.

3.1 Mind is Real

The first pillar of the mind-first theory is realism about the mind. A mind is real. If you have a mind, then a mind exists—and this first pillar is secure.

For the sake of modesty, I will work with a minimal concept of mind: a mind is a field of awareness that can include such things as thoughts. For example, if you think that Donald Trump is President, that thought occurs within your field of awareness (i.e., your mind).

I leave open what other contents a mind might include. It is consistent with this account that a mind can contain any element of consciousness—images, sensations, feelings, hopes, or moods. This understanding fits with my view that there is one fundamental kind of consciousness that manifests in many forms. We often distinguish forms of consciousness associated with the mind from those associated with the heart or body. Yet, in my analysis, these are not distinct types of consciousness but rather distinct contents within a single kind of awareness. Thoughts and reasons, for example, are contents we associate with the mind; emotions and desires are contents we associate with the heart. In my view, there is only one kind of unified field of consciousness with many partitions of content. In the interest of modesty, the mind-first theory leaves this further account of the kinds of consciousness open. At minimum, a mind can have thoughts as contents of consciousness.

The key idea, then, is that some form of mind is real. I leave open further questions about its nature—whether it is physical, immaterial, or something else. What matters for our purposes is that there exists a field of awareness in which conceptual structures such as thoughts can occur.

3.2 Mind Is Fundamental

The second pillar concerns the fundamentality of mind. To understand what I mean, consider first what “fundamental” means. Something is fundamental, on my account, if it does not depend upon, or arise from, anything more basic.

To illustrate, consider an ocean wave. The wave depends on the ocean for its existence and nature, while the ocean can exist without that particular wave. The ocean, therefore, is more fundamental than the ocean wave. A most fundamental reality would be the ultimate context upon which everything else depends.

To say that mind is fundamental, then, is to say that some form of mind is not grounded in anything else but serves as part of the foundation for everything else. In other words, there is a field of awareness in which thoughts, reasons, and intentions can arise, and this field itself is not derived from a deeper, non-mental reality. On this view, mind is like an ocean in which waves of thought occur.

There are different ways this might work. One idea is in terms of a mind-first analysis of matter itself. The idea that we could analyze matter as itself derivative from mental states was anticipated by Max Planck, who remarked, “I regard matter as derivative from consciousness.”^[1] More recently, physicist Richard Conn Henry summarizes his analysis of recent experiments by announcing that “the universe is mental.”[2] The pioneer in quantum field theory, Carlo Roveli, supports this analysis in his suggestion that our best current theory of matter is in terms of informational states (Roveli 2014), which we can analyze as conceptual structures in a fundamental field of awareness.[3] Even if we don’t analyze mater in terms of underlying mental states, we can still understand material forms as emerging from a fundamentally mental order.

Two clarifications are in order. First, the mind-first theory does not claim that mind is the only fundamental reality. It allows that the foundation of reality may include several fundamental features or aspects. One could, for instance, hold that both mind and matter are co-fundamental, or even identify mind with a certain form of matter.[4]

Second, the theory does not claim that every mind is fundamental. My own view is that every mind is intimately connected to one fundamental mind, though there are different theories of that “intimate relation.” Perhaps the fundamental mind causes other minds to exist. Or perhaps it partitions its own consciousness to constitute many individual minds. Other possibilities remain open. What matters is simply that at least some mind is fundamental.

3.3 The Mind Acts

The third pillar of the mind-first theory is that the mind can act. A mental action is any mental process that brings about some effect. For example, if you intend to count to ten, that intention is a mental state that can cause you to begin counting. This pillar affirms the reality of mental causation: things in your mind can make a difference.

Here we stand at the edge of the causal exclusion problem. The challenge, recall, is to explain how mental causation could occur if the underlying causes are purely mindless motions. The mind-first view avoids this problem by rejecting that assumption. It proposes instead that some mental actions are basic—not derived from or constrained by deeper, non-mental causes.

Consider an example. When you direct your attention to counting numbers, that very act of attention can bring to mind a sequence of numbers. Your act may be influenced by prior mental states, but it is not pinned down by mindless motions that would exclude its causal power. The act itself—an exercise of awareness—possesses genuine efficacy.

An advantage of this “mental action” pillar is that it stands independently of specific theories of causation or free will. Whether free will is compatible or incompatible with determinism, mental acts can still make a difference. Likewise, whether causation is understood in singular, probabilistic, or law-like terms, the core idea remains. Mental states can produce effects on a variety of theories. Thus, this pillar can stand firm amid the many debates surrounding causation and freedom.

3.4 The Mind Reasons

The fourth and final pillar concerns reasoning itself. The mind-first theory maintains that reasoning can make a difference. Let us consider how.

Imagine you are trying to remember where you placed your phone. You usually keep it by your bed, but sometimes you set it on your dresser. Not seeing it by your bed, you infer that it is likely on your dresser. Acting on this inference, you check the dresser and find your phone. In this simple case, your reasoning guided your belief and action.

According to the mind-first theory, we can understand this process in terms of basic mental acts. Your inference is not constructed from mindless building blocks or pulled by atomic motions. Rather, the inference arises within a mind that provides the context for you to direct your thoughts along logical lines, just as the open sky provides space for birds to fly along various directed paths.

To illustrate, suppose you reason, A or B; not A; therefore B. In this case, you are performing a mental act of perceiving a logical relation. You perceive a connection between premises and conclusion, and this perception guides your belief. The reasoning is rational precisely because it tracks logical reality. Again, the underlying basis for the reasoning is not mindless motions, but rather a mind acting according to logical tracks.

This account dissolves the causal exclusion problem. There are no mindless motions “pulling the strings” behind the scenes. The causal agents here are mental: one mental state (the perception of a logical relation) gives rise to another (the inference). These occur within a unified field of awareness—within mind itself. The logical structures discerned in thought reflect the logical nature of mind. In this way, mind enables reasoning rather than excluding it.

Taken together, these four pillars form a unified framework for understanding reasoning within a mind-first reality. To review: (i) mind is real, (ii) it is fundamental rather than grounded in the mindless, (iii) it possesses causal power, and (iv) it can discern and respond to reasons. Within this framework, the phenomenon of reasoning is a natural expression of reality’s most fundamental nature.

4. Objections

We will now consider several objections to further test the mind-first theory and the causal exclusion argument that supports it. To review, here again is the argument:

1. Realism: Reasoning exists.

2. Causal Efficacy: Reasoning makes a difference.

3. Causal Exclusion: If reasoning exists and makes a difference, then reality cannot be fundamentally mindless.

4. Conclusion: Therefore, reality is not fundamentally mindless.

We will look at an objection to each premise, followed by an objection to the conclusion itself.

Objection 1: Mental Phenomena Are Not Real

The first objection targets premise 1, which affirms that reasoning exists. Its support depends on realism about mental phenomena. Yet as we have seen, some philosophers have argued that mental phenomena do not really exist. What we experience as thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, some say, are illusions—like a mirage of water in the desert. If this eliminativism is right, then reasoning, being a kind of mental phenomenon, is itself unreal, and premise 1 is false.

Although it may seem counterintuitive to deny the existence of mental phenomena, the objection invites us to examine the roots of our beliefs about the world. How do we know that there truly is an inner life of thoughts and reasons? While it may seem that we have thoughts, sometimes reality is not as it seems.

Some philosophers note that scientific progress often reveals explanations that contradict our initial impressions. When you watch a sunset, for instance, it may seem as if the sun is revolving around the earth. But we now know that this appearance is misleading. Likewise, even if it seems to you that you have thoughts in your mind, how can you be sure that you have real thoughts or a real mind?

There is also a question about how mental phenomena could exist in a fundamentally material world. Some philosophers argue that the “hard problem” of consciousness shows that mental phenomena cannot, even in principle, be explained in purely physicalist terms.[5] Thinking, for instance, occurs from a first-person point of view, whereas the material world—at least as described by physics—contains no first-person perspectives at all. How could motions in a purely third-person reality ever add up to first-person awareness of logical inferences? Some conclude that such an explanation is impossible, and that because everything must be explicable in physical terms, we should doubt that genuine thinking ever occurs (Rosenberg 2011). On this view, thinking as we experience it—from the inside—simply does not fit within the scientific image of a fundamentally physical world.

Reply to Objection 1.

This objection has two wings: (i) epistemological and (ii) metaphysical. I will reply to each in turn.

Consider, first, the epistemological problem: how can you know that you think? The most fundamental answer is this: you possess a power to know the contents of your own consciousness directly. Call this power introspection. By its light, you can be immediately aware—right now—of your experience of seeing these words. If you close your eyes and reflect on this very proposal, that reflection itself becomes something you are aware of in your mind. This awareness does not depend on perceiving anything else. It is direct and immediate. You know it in the most fundamental way you know anything at all—simply by experiencing it.

I will offer three clarifications in support of this power to know the contents of consciousness. First, you do not need infallible knowledge to have genuine knowledge. You may occasionally misdescribe what you were thinking or perceiving, but it does not follow that you can never know that you think or perceive. Errors often arise from oversimplifying or exaggerating aspects of experience, but these errors do not eliminate the basic fact that you can be aware of experiences within consciousness.

Second, an experience can be real even if it does not represent anything outside the mind. If you dream of dragons, the dream-experience is real, even if no dragons exist beyond the dream. This point matters for the claim that mental phenomena are “illusions.” An illusion occurs when reality differs from how things appear, but the appearance itself—the experience—is real. If it seems to you that you are thinking, that seeming is an actual experience. My proposal is that the very power by which you are aware that you seem to think is the same power by which you can be aware of thinking itself. In general, you cannot even be aware of an illusory experience unless you are aware of an experience. The power to recognize experiences is the same power by which you recognize reasoning.

Finally, the power to know contents of consciousness is foundational to scientific inquiry. Science depends on observation and reasoning—but both observing and reasoning are themselves conscious activities. To know that you have made an observation, or that you have drawn a prediction by reasoning, is already to be aware of events within consciousness. This awareness of your own observing and reasoning is precisely what I mean by knowing contents of consciousness. For this reason, if scientific inquiry is possible, as skeptics of mental phenomena typically affirm, then conscious awareness of mental phenomena is also possible.

This completes my response to the epistemological wing of the objection. In summary: you can know the contents of consciousness directly. You do not rely on empirical evidence for this knowledge, but on a more basic power of introspection—a power that undergirds scientific investigation itself.

My second reply addresses the metaphysical wing of the objection. This is the challenge of explaining mental phenomena in purely physical terms. Here my answer is that the problem arises only if we begin with a narrow conception of what counts as a possible explanation. If we start with purely physical and non-mental building blocks, then it is indeed mysterious how mental realities could emerge. But the mind-first theory I have offered is not confined to non-mental resources. It allows mental phenomena to be explained, at least in part, in terms of other mental phenomena, with a fundamental mind at the base of reality. On this view, there is no transition from a wholly mindless, third-person reality to a first-person, conscious one. The first-person dimension is there from the start; it is part of the foundation.

Of course, many philosophers do not accept a mind-first approach. But the key point is this: the hard problem of consciousness itself depends on a mindless-first framework. If instead mind is fundamental, there is no longer a need to explain how consciousness arises from the non-conscious, because consciousness is already in the basement of being. It would be circular—or question-begging—to assume the falsity of the mind-first theory when raising an objection to an argument that is designed to support it. Instead, we can reason in the opposite direction. Mental phenomena exist (as revealed by direct conscious awareness), and if so, then the nature of reality must permit their existence. If one is persuaded that a purely physical world cannot account for mental reality, then one need not eliminate the mental. Instead, one can follow a logical path to the mind-first theory.

Objection 2: Reasoning Does Nothing

The exclusion argument depends on the premise that reasoning makes a difference. But why think that is true? Perhaps reasoning is merely an epiphenomenal by-product of deeper physical causes—a shadow rather than a force. On this view, reasoning itself does nothing.

Reply to Objection 2

I have already offered two motivations for thinking that reasoning does, in fact, make a difference. The first, recall, was that reasoning helps explain the tight link between the conceptual content of certain thoughts and the resulting states of affairs. If you intend to buy twelve eggs, the conceptual content of your intention matches the outcome: your probability of buying twelve eggs increases. This alignment between content and consequence suggests causal connection, not coincidence. The second motivation was from the nature of rational belief. A belief is rational only if it is based on reasoning. But no belief could be based on reasoning if reasoning had no causal power. The very possibility of rational belief therefore requires that reasoning make a difference.

Here I offer a third motivation: introspection. Through the light of introspection, I believe you can directly observe the effects of reasoning within your own mind. Even now, as you weigh these ideas, you are drawing inferences. This experience—one thought giving rise to another—is an experience of reasoning making a difference. For example, if you see that a mind-first theory is incompatible with a mindless-first theory (by the law of non-contradiction), you can deduce that reality cannot be fundamentally both mental and mindless. You can notice this deduction as it alters your thoughts. If so, then you have direct experiential access to the causal work of reasoning. (Any worldview that denies this knowledge cuts you off from your power of immediate awareness. But such worldviews themselves stand on less sturdy ground.)

Objection 3: Against Exclusion

The causal exclusion premise assumes dualism: that mental states exist over and above physical states. This dualism is the true source of the exclusion problem. If we instead identify mental states with macro-physical states—if a thought just is brain activity—then the causal powers of thoughts can be explained in ordinary physical terms. The exclusion problem disappears, and no mind-first theory is needed.[6]

Reply to Objection 3

I offer two responses. First, while admittedly controversial, I believe introspection reveals a fatal problem for reduction. Consider two possibilities: either (i) the physical brain states underlying your thinking are themselves among the things you are directly conscious of when you think; or (ii) they are not. If (i), then you should be able to directly compare your conceptual thoughts with your brain states, since you are directly aware of both. Speaking for myself, however, I am not directly aware of neurons firing while I am aware of my thinking. I therefore cannot perform any direct comparison between my mental states and physical states to discern their difference or identity. So (i) contradicts my immediate lack of experience with my brain states.

Consider option (ii): when you are conscious of thinking, you are not conscious of your brain states. We may try to reconcile this with reductionism by saying that brain states provide an “outside,” third-person description of what you know directly from the first-person point of view. But for this view to be coherent, we must distinguish between what you know directly and what you do not. By the law of identity, what you know directly is not identical to what you do not know directly: that which is A (known directly) is not that which is not A (not known directly). Thus, by logic, your reasoning—which you know directly—is not identical to brain states, which you do not. This is one reason to think that first-person mental phenomena cannot be reduced to third-person physical phenomena.

Note that this analysis avoids the masked man fallacy, where ono mistakenly infers that a man behind a mask is not someone one knows under a different description (cf. Taliaferro 2018). This fallacy occurs, for example, if you assume that water is not H₂O because you don’t know its molecular makeup while you are drinking it. In this case, however, you do not have direct, conscious access to the molecular makeup of water, even if you do know the effects of water. Your thoughts are importantly different: you do have direct conscious access to yourself thinking. For this reason (and to avoid a contradiction), you can discern that thinking within your consciousness is not the same as something outside your consciousness.

Second, and more fundamentally, reduction does not solve the deepest root of the exclusion problem. Even if mental states are identical to brain states, the brain states themselves are composed of more basic particles. If these particles are the fundamental causal actors, then the complex mental whole becomes a puppet of their motions: the micro-physical states causally exclude the macro-bran states from having causal power over and above the powers of the parts. In other words, every macro-mental state would still be fixed by micro-mindless causes. A puppet problem remains (cf. Bailey & Rasmussen 2020).

If this analysis is correct, then the causal exclusion argument does not depend on whether mental states are material or immaterial. It depends on whether mental states have genuine causal efficacy. If the most fundamental actors are mindless, reasoning cannot contribute anything. Thus, only if some mental states are themselves fundamental actors can reasoning make a difference. Even if mental states reduce to material states, the exclusion problem persists.

Objection 4: Mind Depends on the Brain

The final objection challenges the conclusion itself. The worry here is that the mind-first theory conflicts with the scientific picture of the brain. There is abundant empirical evidence that mental phenomena depend on brain activity. Every conscious state we can measure correlates with a neural process. The simplest explanation of these neural corelates of consciousness is that consciousness arises from complex configurations of matter. The mind-first view, therefore, is at odds with neuroscience.

Reply to Objection 4.

This objection is important because it can prevent the mind-first theory from being taken seriously. If one assumes that science already shows reality to be fundamentally mindless, the causal argument may seem like a clever puzzle rather than a path to truth.

However, the empirical evidence is open to multiple interpretations. What we have are correlations between mental states and neural activity. The correlations, however, can be explained in different ways. For example, Hiley and Pylkkänen propose a model in which consciousness affects brain activity within the boundaries of known physical laws.[7] According to their model, small mental influences on the brain can accumulate, leading to largescale effects. Consistent with this idea is McFadden’s evidence for the theory that consciousness integrates information as an energy field. According to this theory, consciousness can influence energy fields that in turn can affect local and distant systems. In general, the evidence does not tell us which way the dependence runs: it could be that some mental states depend on physical states, while some physical states depend on some mental states.

Moreover, the mind-first theory can explain why there is any correlation at all. A fundamental mind might give rise to physical structures that express or reflect its mental activity. Crummett and Cutter (2022) develop this idea into a reason to think that psycho-physical harmony is itself be more likely if there is a deeper mental explanation of psycho-physical coordination.

Finally, even if mental-physical coordination were just as expected on a purely mindless-first theory, that leaves us at best at a stalemate. In this light, the causal exclusion argument helps to break the tie. Direct awareness of reasoning, together with conceptual analysis, reveals an independent causal exclusion problem for mindless-first theories. The mind-first theory, by contrast, makes sense of both the existence and the efficacy of reasoning. This account does not sidestep the empirical data but organizes it into a greater light.

5. Conclusion

To recap, the causal exclusion argument begins with a simple observation: reasoning exists. We are directly aware of reasoning as it unfolds in our own minds. We also observe that reasoning makes a difference: it shapes what we believe and do. Yet if the foundations of reality were wholly mindless, it is not obvious how there could be a place for reasoning to arise. After all, mindless motions do not, just in virtue of their mindlessness or their movements, align themselves with the meaningful structure of logical inference. In short, mindless foundations would causally exclude the mental. From these premises, it follows that reality cannot be fundamentally mindless. Some form of mind must exist at the foundation of reality.

I would like to close with a reflection on why the causal exclusion argument for a mental foundation has been easy to overlook. A certain materialist paradigm has cast a long shadow over the discussion. Within this paradigm, philosophers have identified a causal exclusion problem, not for a mindless-first theory, but for dualist theories. The reasoning goes like this: if reality is fundamentally physical and mindless, then there is no room for non-physical mental events to add causal power beyond what physics already accounts for. Thus, either mental phenomena are causal and therefore physical, or they are epiphenomenal or illusory. From within the materialist paradigm, then, the exclusion problem targets dualism, not materialism.[8]

But we have seen that reduction does not remove the deeper root of the exclusion problem. Even if mental states are taken to be physical, macro-physical states themselves face an exclusion challenge: how can they make a difference if all causation is ultimately fixed by micro-physical, mindless particles? This deeper problem does not target dualism alone. It challenges mindless-first materialism itself.

The materialist paradigm is strengthened by a familiar story of emergence. We are accustomed to watching new patterns arise from older ones: life emerges from chemistry, weather from air currents, sound from vibration. Because this heuristic works well in many areas, it is natural to extend it to consciousness: perhaps mind too emerges when matter becomes sufficiently complex.

One way to lift the shadow is to distinguish between broad materialism and mindless-first materialism. Some philosophers have proposed that mind is a fundamental aspect of matter itself. This is a mind-first theory, and it is fully compatible with the conclusion of the exclusion argument. My aim is not to defend materialism, but to remove an unnecessary obstacle. You can hold a broadly materialist view and still affirm that mind is fundamental. If we can look past a mindless-first materialist frame, we position ourselves to see a more basic lesson: whether the world is fundamentally material or not, the deeper exclusion problem points to a world whose foundation includes the resources of a mind.

In conclusion, the value of the causal exclusion argument is that it brings to light the significance of a familiar feature of our lives: reasoning. The existence of reasoning is a window into the fundamental nature of reality. If the exclusion argument is sound, then your reasoning—even right now—takes place within a mental context that is not grounded in random motions or mindless reactions. It is grounded in something deeper. By this light, we can see that reason points to the fundamentality of mind.

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[1] Interview with M. Planck, The Observer, January 25, 1931.

[2] Richard Conn Henry, “The Mental Universe,” Nature 436, no. 29 (2005).

[3] I develop and defend this mind-first theory of matter in Rasmussen 2023.

[4] See Donald Hoffman and Chetan Prakash, “Objects of Consciousness,” Frontiers in Psychology (2004): https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00577.

[5] Keith Frankish, for example, cites the explanatory problem as a reason to eliminate the “what it’s like” character of consciousness. He suggests instead that this aspect of consciousness is an illusion (Frankish 2016).

[6] For a development of this reductive solution the problem of causal exclusion, see Papineau 2009.

[7] B.J. Hiley and Paavo Pyklkkanen, “Can Mind Affect Matter via Active Information?” Mind and Matter 3, no. 2 (2005): 8-27.

[8] See, for example, the classic causal exclusion argument developed by Jaegwon Kim (1998).