The Trinity and Arbitrary Limits

Is fundamental reality shaped like a triangle?

Here I will address the trinity objection to my Argument from Arbitrary Limits. (For a recent unpacking of this type of argument, see section 3, “The Story of Great Stuff.” from my article, “Why is There Anything?”)

The Argument from Arbitrary Limits purports to show that fundamental reality lacks arbitrary, unexplained limits, and that (by additional steps) such a reality would be purely perfect (in its essence). If this argument is sound, then fundamental reality is not fundamentally shaped like a triangle!

Enter the Trinity Objection: if we shave arbitrary limits, then God is not triune because being tri-personal would be an arbitrary limit on the number of persons.

My Puzzlement about the Objection

This objection puzzled me the first time I saw Felipe Leon raise it in our dialogue. What puzzled me is not how to reply to the objection, but how this objection is supposed to work.

The objection depends on two premises:

1. If a perfect foundation were to exist, it would be triune.

2. If the foundation were triune, then it would have an arbitrary, unexplained limit.

3. Conclusion: the conclusion of the Argument from Arbitrary Limits is false.

One type of reply (which I offered in the dialogue) is to suggest how someone might challenge (2). In particular, I suggested how someone might have reason to think that being triune is explicable in terms of more fundamental principles (w/o arbitrary limits), for example, that a perfect foundation, in virtue of its perfection, would enjoy cooperative love among (at least) 3 conscious centers.

However, subsequent discussions incline me to think that my initial reply was actually too generous and ultimately distracting. The Argument from Arbitrary Limits does not address trinitarian theology one way or the other. Some people seemed to get the impression that if all attempts at explaining/grounding a triune nature fail, then the Trinity Objection is somehow vindicated. But that takes us into distracting territory because the Trinity Objection depends on both (1) and (2), not just (2).

I now think it is more helpful for me to share my initial puzzlement (rather than try attempt to answer valuable, but distracting questions). My puzzlement is this: I'm puzzled as to why anyone would accept both (1) and (2). I don't think Felipe accepts (1), and there are no arguments even on offer for either premise.

Indeed, the premises appear to me to be in tension with each other. Suppose you accept (1) and think God is triune. Then, in light of the general track-record of explaining limits, you might find yourself expecting that being triune could be explained (whether you have any idea how or not). Then you would have reason not to accept (2). Or suppose you thought that a perfect foundation wouldn't have to be triune. Then you wouldn't be in position to accept (1).

Speaking for myself, I can tell you that for any theology T, if I were persuaded that T entails that there are arbitrary, unexplained limits, that would have given me reason to reject T.

Of course, I understand there is a dialectical strategy in raising the Trinity Objection to someone who thinks God is triune. But even dialectically, I don't see how the argument is supposed to work. Is there any human being on earth—whether theist or non-theist—who actually finds themselves inclined to accept both (1) and (2)?* If not, who is the objection supposed to appeal to? Not its proponents, because they don't accept (1). Not its opponents, because they reject (1) or (2) or both. If no one accepts the premises of the objection, not even its proponents, then I propose we toss the Trinity Objection into the dust bin of history.

*EDIT: William Lane Craig told me in personal correspondence that he would accept both premises unless “limit” is restricted to great-ness detracting limitation. Interesting!

New Thoughts

A final remark. Even if we toss away the Trinity Objection, it can still be instructive. In particular, it invites us to consider what kind of non-arbitrary limits fundamental reality might have. Some people have suggested to me that if fundamental reality could ground some limits, it might ground limits in various divine attributes, such as power, knowledge, or value. I welcome this consideration.

Indeed, there is room to explore what limits even perfection itself might imply (e.g., a limit in ability to cease to exist). My own view has been that any properties that might detract from perfection (i.e., perfection-precluding limits) are uniformly explicable—and thus not fundamental. If this view is correct, then fundamental reality has no perfection-precluding limits. Even still, fundamental reality might have other kinds of limits. The landscape of possibilities here is wide open for exploration.