What Does Omnipotence Mean?

The Best Account Ever...

1. The Question

A reader recently asked me about omnipotence. What is the best way to understand divine power? Does omnipotence mean “the ability to do all logically possible things”? Or do we need a more refined account, one that takes into consideration God’s nature, goodness, and the structure of reality itself?

The question is important. Many accounts of omnipotence have been developed over the years. Do any work? I will offer my idea at the end.

2. Problems with Simple Accounts

To begin, let us consider the simple proposal that an omnipotent being can do anything that is logically possible to do. At first, that sounds reasonable. Surely, if God is all-powerful, then God can do anything that is logically possible. God cannot make a square circle, since a square circle is not a possible thing. But God can do everything that falls within the realm of possibility.

Yet philosophers have recognized that the simple definition of omnipotence quickly runs into trouble. The problem is that some logically possible tasks are possible only for the particular person who performs them. For example, it is logically possible for me to correctly say, “I am Josh.” But it is not logically possible for someone who is not Josh to perform that same task. They could say the words, of course. But they could not correctly say them. So here we have a logically possible action that not every being can perform.

The same issue appears in another way. It is logically possible for a being to gain new powers. A child can gain the power to read. A student can gain the power to understand calculus. A weak person can become stronger. But a being who already has every possible power cannot gain new powers. There are no new powers left to gain.

So if omnipotence means “the ability to do every logically possible thing,” then no being is omnipotent. For some logically possible things are possible only for beings who are limited in certain ways.

This result does not show that omnipotence is incoherent on any definition (within a natural semantic range). It shows that the simple definition is too crude.

Another—more modest—approach is to understand omnipotence as maximal power: having as much power as it is possible to have. On this account, an omnipotent being does not have every power considered in isolation, since some powers cannot be combined. For example, the power to gain new powers is not compatible with already possessing maximal power.

Still, this account leaves open what powers are included in maximal power. It also leaves open whether a maximal power is compatible with other divine attributes, like maximal knowledge or perfect goodness. Challenges remain.

3. A Theory of Unlimited Power

To present my own working hypothesis, consider, first, that some “limitations” are not defects in power. They are consequences of power. For example, a being who cannot fail to exist or become incapable of anything is not weak for that reason. Building on this consideration, my own working hypothesis is this: fundamental reality has no arbitrary, unexplained limit in power. Perhaps we could call it “omnipotent” in at least this minimal sense: it has power without any arbitrary, unexplained limit. Any limits in power, then, will have some deeper explanation, such as in terms of its fundamental nature or goodness, where that fundamental nature is likewise non-arbitrarily limited.

That hypothesis does not settle every question. It leaves open what powers fundamental reality might have specifically. But it gives us a guiding idea: if reality has a foundation, and if that foundation is not explained by anything deeper, then any fundamental properties it has will themselves lack any deeper explanation. So if particular limits in power, size, or any other quality along a continuum of more or less will call for a deeper explanation, the must fundamental explanation cannot itself be in terms of limits. In this sense, its power will be unlimited (lacking arbitrary, unexplained limits). The idea of omnipotence, then, may be best understood not as the ability to perform every task, but as the absence of arbitrary limitation in the power at the foundation of reality.

This account also avoids various puzzles about how an omnipotent being might have other classical divine attributes, like maximal awareness or goodness. Nothing in the account restricts fundamental reality in any obvious way from having other classical “great-making” attributes.

I’m not saying the account does not open up its own puzzles. That is to be explored.

But I think it lays the foundation for an account of the power of fundamental reality that avoids the thorns of many other puzzles, classical and contemporary. So I offer it for your consideration, whether to build upon, alter, or utterly destroy—as the light of reason leads.

4. References

For more on the challenges of defining “maximal greatness” more generally, see my review of J. Speaks’ book, The Greatest Possible Being.

For more on the puzzles of omnipotence, see:

Pearce, Kenneth L., and Alexander R. Pruss. “Understanding Omnipotence.” Religious Studies 48, no. 3 (2012): 403–414. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412512000030.

Mavrodes, George I. “Some Puzzles Concerning Omnipotence.” The Philosophical Review 72, no. 2 (1963): 221–223. https://doi.org/10.2307/2183106.

Frankfurt, Harry G. “The Logic of Omnipotence.” The Philosophical Review 73, no. 2 (1964): 262–263.

Cowan, J. L. “The Paradox of Omnipotence.” Analysis 25 (1965): 102–108.

Savage, C. Wade. “The Paradox of the Stone.” The Philosophical Review 76, no. 1 (1967): 74–79. https://doi.org/10.2307/2182966.

Pike, Nelson. “Omnipotence and God’s Ability to Sin.” American Philosophical Quarterly 6, no. 3 (1969): 208–216.

Geach, P. T. “Omnipotence.” Philosophy 48, no. 183 (1973): 7–20.

Swinburne, Richard. “Omnipotence.” American Philosophical Quarterly 10 (1973): 231–237.

La Croix, Richard R. “The Impossibility of Defining ‘Omnipotence.’” Philosophical Studies 32, no. 2 (1977): 181–190.

Rosenkrantz, Gary, and Joshua Hoffman. “What an Omnipotent Agent Can Do.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11, no. 1 (1980): 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00138761.

Flint, Thomas P., and Alfred J. Freddoso. “Maximal Power.” In The Existence and Nature of God, edited by Alfred J. Freddoso, 81–114. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983.

Wierenga, Edward. “Omnipotence Defined.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 43, no. 3 (1983): 363–375. https://doi.org/10.2307/2107343.

Wielenberg, Erik J. “Omnipotence Again.” Faith and Philosophy 17, no. 1 (2000): 26–47.

Morriston, Wes. “Omnipotence and Necessary Moral Perfection: Are They Compatible?” Religious Studies 37, no. 2 (2001): 143–160.

Oppy, Graham. “Omnipotence.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71, no. 1 (2005): 58–84.