A Problem of Evil for Atheism
How certain types of suffering could point to God
Is evil a prima facie problem for theism? Depends. If you see a cat burned in a fire, you might have the sense that (i) an omni-God would never allow that were it in position to stop it, and that (ii) an omni-God, if it were to exist, would have been in position to stop it. If you have that sense, it presents you with a prima facie problem for theism. I think we can all relate to an experience like that.
But I want to share how evil could seem to someone to instead be a prima facie problem for non-theism. Okay, I won't hide behind "someone." I'll be vulnerable. I will share some of my intuitions, for whatever they may be worth.
First, on theism, I'd expect soul-developing experiences to emerge that would include trials and uncertainties, like in a great story (somewhere at some time), whereas on non-theism, I wouldn't expect reality to unfold along the narrow lines to produce any arenas in which trials or feelings of uncertainty could occur. These expectations, then, provide a prima facie challenge for non-theism from the general observation that there are some negatively felt states (e.g., trials).
I have a similar sense for more specific categories of bad:
Mysterious evil: on theism, I'd expect there to be reasons beyond creaturely ken, whereas on non-theism, I'd expect no creatures to ever exist, or if they do exist, they would be blobs of matter incapable of wondering about anything.
Injustice: on theism, I'd expect hero-making arenas, in which kingly creatures learn to overcome problems and bring justice in an ever-advancing world; on non-theism, by contrast, I wouldn't expect justice or injustice to ever be instantiated, or for reality to produce any agents who can apprehend any principles of justice or injustice.
Death and disease: on theism, I'd expect episodes in the soul-building adventure where there is real danger, like disease (so that (ii) above doesn't apply because of prior contracts/laws). I'd also expect everything bad to be able to work together for incomparably greater jewels of good (in later episodes). On non-theism, by contrast, it is bizarre to me that reality would happen to have any real adventure (as opposed to random dots, scattering randomly forever).
Amount of suffering: on theism, I'd expect the amounts of danger to be finely tuned for soul & relationship building experiences, for individuals, families, cities, nations, and species; on non-theism, by contrast, even if I add to the root theory that sentient beings exist, I still wouldn't expect anything as specific as pain. Instead, I'd expect sentience to be chaotic, epi-phenomenal (hence, no adaptive role), and entirely unrelated to any meaningful life-story.
Non-belief in God: on theism, I'd expect various paths to discovering more and more good things in the foundation of existence, with truth-seekers learning to love each other even while still in the face of deep disagreements; on non-theism, by contrast, it seems surprising to me that bits of reality would, or could, bring to life beings who would ever wonder whether God exists. Even if sentience did occur, I'd expect it to be almost entirely meaningless noise.
So, each of these categories of evil provides for me a prima facie reason in support of theism, not atheism. This assessment is based on a Bayesian understanding of “evidential support,” according to which some data supports a hypothesis H if that data is more likely on H than ~H. (In a future post, I plan to consider how this analysis can shed some light on Draper’s evidential argument from evil.)
Four disclaimers:
First, the above intuitions are consistent with also having the intuition that some specific events just wouldn't have happened on theism.
Second, I don't say that I'd expect every category of evil on theism. More specific categories, like my missing socks, are not specifically predicted by theism (or non-theism).
Third, I don't say that the good of adventurous, soul-building lives explains all (or most) evil. To expect evil on theism for reason R is not to identify R as the reason for evil. Compare: if I read an academic book, I expect to find the word "true" somewhere and so expect to find the letter "e". But that doesn't mean the book contains an "e" only for that reason. Many other words are even more likely to contain an "e" (like "the"). Similarly, I think there would be many, many other reasons for evil, on theism. The value of an advancing adventure is just a grain in a measureless mountain of values and considerations.
Fourth, there are some events involving animal suffering that still perplex me, but less so than they did initially (especially after reflection on the prospect of animal resurrection and the natural requirements for nested soul-building arenas for creatures great and small). I don't say my intuitions are the one's anyone else should have. Everyone has their own sense, based on their own unique experiences.
In closing, your sense is your inner light. Follow it. See where it takes you. If my theory is right, everyone who follows their inner light, discovers the truths that matter most to them, in the time that matters most.
Hi Josh! A friend of mine shared the following with me in response to your above post. I found them very insightful.
How might you respond to the insights below?
"Some thoughts:
1. I agree that "soul-developing experiences" that include "trials and uncertainties" are expected under theism. But, really, the only "evil" that would be expected given this is types that "challenge you", but don't actually cause egregious suffering; I'm talking about, say, the pain of working out (which brings about the theoretical values of discipline, courage, etc.), climbing a mountain, taking risks, etc. These activities cause pain, but that pain is (1) intentionally being inflicted by free-willed creatures on themselves with consent, and (2) not so egregious that it scars them for life. In that case, while the soul-developing theodicy works against some kinds of "evils" (I'm hesitant to really even call it that, if we define evil as "a state of affairs that (from an axiological standpoint) should not be taking place"), it doesn't work against the ones that are non-consensual and the ones people are particularly worried about (death, disease, famine, genocide, rape, etc.) You yourself agreed with this, I remember you saying in a call that you can't say that "it's good that that guy got hit in a car crash because he found God" because "that's terrible".
2. Regarding mysterious evil: I'm not sure what "mysterious evil" refers to, but I find "on non-theism, I'd expect no creatures to ever exist," to not actually solve the POE, though it is something very important to point out and argue for. I think we can agree on this though. So I think that it's best to go by the presupposition that embodied moral creatures exist under both worldviews when assessing these arguments, because if we don't go by that, it kind of removes the actual purpose - logically and emotionally - of the arguments.
3. Regarding injustice: I would definitely not expect injustice under theism, given that God loves his creatures and wants to build a state of affairs where they are happy, doing meaningful things, and having meaningful relationships with others. Injustice prevents this from occurring, and causes people to suffer and feel unsatisfied, mistreated, and undervalued in life. Under theism, it seems far more reasonable for their to be a world where all creatures get to live how they want to live, with adequate food, water, shelter, clothing, acquaintances, etc. Soul-developing does not justify a world where there is injustice, because you can already help others without injustice; for example, if someone is constructing a new house in the ideal theistic world, you can help them out with that, or you can give them advice on attracting a marriage mate, parenting, etc. (since those are still going to be problems given free will). As for injustice under naturalism, since there is no God governing the world (only humans), humans can mistreat eachother by spreading racism and hate for other groups of people, withholding resources from one another, etc. Under theism, given God's perfect rule, none of those things are probable.
4. Regarding the amount of suffering: I totally agree that "on theism, I'd expect the amounts of danger to be finely tuned for soul & relationship building experiences, for individuals, families, cities, nations, and species", but this is absolutely not what we see in the world; we see pretty egregious amounts of suffering and evil, including disease, famine, (sometimes premature) death, genocide, mass murder, political corruption, racism and ethnic hatred, fraud and theft, natural disasters, intense warfare, rape, child sexual abuse, and much more (not even including animal suffering), and so I take the amount of suffering and evil we see as evidence against theism. Regarding the amount of suffering under naturalism, you've said that "I still wouldn't expect anything as specific as pain. Instead, I'd expect sentience to be chaotic, epi-phenomenal (hence, no adaptive role), and entirely unrelated to any meaningful life-story." I understand the life story part (but, at the end of the day, the suffering we see in this world is not related to a life story either) but, regarding the other things, I'd like to know why you they are expected under naturalism; is it related to design arguments (like the FTA and evolutionary arguments) that, in your view, render the probability of embodied moral creatures under naturalism low?
5. Regarding death and disease (skipped past that one on accident lol): I agree that some danger and pain is needed under theism for the protection of the creatures in question and for the sake of some theoretical values mentioned earlier. But, a couple things should be said. Firstly, I don't see how disease is a necessary pain to go through; it never happens because of doing something virtuous in the same way that, say, pain felt in the gym does (like, no one does things that'll get them sick on purpose for the sake of theoretical virtues, except for maybe partying during covid, which you and I would agree isn't actually virtuous), and I don't see a reason why God would create a world with disease. Secondly, no amount of danger and pain felt in the ideal theistic world should be able to cause actual biological death, because biological death is absolutely not expected under theism if God loves his creatures; yet, in our world, it does. Thirdly, you've said that under theism you'd expect "everything bad to be able to work together for incomparably greater jewels of good", but this doesn't happen in a lot of cases; for example, what about athletes who are injured when they're young and can never pursue their goals and dreams in life ever again because of their injury? Sure, they might learn a lesson about pain and life from that, but that doesn't trump the pain of never being able to achieve a goal they loved so much.
6. Regarding non-belief: I agree that "on theism, I'd expect various paths *to* discovering more and more good things in the foundation of existence, with truth-seekers learning to love each other even while still in the face of deep disagreements". We don't see this precisely under theism (look at New Atheism) but that's not really an issue for theism, because of free will. Under naturalism, I don't see how this would be any different; and I'm curious as to why you would hold that "even if sentience did occur, I'd expect it to be almost entirely meaningless noise."
7. It should be understood that if you hold that the types of evil you mentioned above are probabilistically likely under theism, you would have to hold that they would be probabilistically likely to occur in the earthly paradise that God - by your theology - promises for the future and intended for humans. That means you would have to hold that it is at least probabilistically likely"mysterious evil", injustice, death and disease, the amount of suffering we see in the world today, and widespread non-belief will all be actualized in the future paradise and were all God's intention from the start. If you were to disaffirm this, you'd be saying that those things aren't likely under theism, thus forfeiting the argument.
Those are my thoughts though."
Why would God ever need to focus on soul-building when he can create agents with all the experiences you need for any situation ever?