Hi Josh! A friend of mine shared the following with me in response to your above post. I found them very insightful.
How might you respond to the insights below?
"Some thoughts:
1. I agree that "soul-developing experiences" that include "trials and uncertainties" are expected under theism. But, really, the only "evil" that would be expected given this is types that "challenge you", but don't actually cause egregious suffering; I'm talking about, say, the pain of working out (which brings about the theoretical values of discipline, courage, etc.), climbing a mountain, taking risks, etc. These activities cause pain, but that pain is (1) intentionally being inflicted by free-willed creatures on themselves with consent, and (2) not so egregious that it scars them for life. In that case, while the soul-developing theodicy works against some kinds of "evils" (I'm hesitant to really even call it that, if we define evil as "a state of affairs that (from an axiological standpoint) should not be taking place"), it doesn't work against the ones that are non-consensual and the ones people are particularly worried about (death, disease, famine, genocide, rape, etc.) You yourself agreed with this, I remember you saying in a call that you can't say that "it's good that that guy got hit in a car crash because he found God" because "that's terrible".
2. Regarding mysterious evil: I'm not sure what "mysterious evil" refers to, but I find "on non-theism, I'd expect no creatures to ever exist," to not actually solve the POE, though it is something very important to point out and argue for. I think we can agree on this though. So I think that it's best to go by the presupposition that embodied moral creatures exist under both worldviews when assessing these arguments, because if we don't go by that, it kind of removes the actual purpose - logically and emotionally - of the arguments.
3. Regarding injustice: I would definitely not expect injustice under theism, given that God loves his creatures and wants to build a state of affairs where they are happy, doing meaningful things, and having meaningful relationships with others. Injustice prevents this from occurring, and causes people to suffer and feel unsatisfied, mistreated, and undervalued in life. Under theism, it seems far more reasonable for their to be a world where all creatures get to live how they want to live, with adequate food, water, shelter, clothing, acquaintances, etc. Soul-developing does not justify a world where there is injustice, because you can already help others without injustice; for example, if someone is constructing a new house in the ideal theistic world, you can help them out with that, or you can give them advice on attracting a marriage mate, parenting, etc. (since those are still going to be problems given free will). As for injustice under naturalism, since there is no God governing the world (only humans), humans can mistreat eachother by spreading racism and hate for other groups of people, withholding resources from one another, etc. Under theism, given God's perfect rule, none of those things are probable.
4. Regarding the amount of suffering: I totally agree that "on theism, I'd expect the amounts of danger to be finely tuned for soul & relationship building experiences, for individuals, families, cities, nations, and species", but this is absolutely not what we see in the world; we see pretty egregious amounts of suffering and evil, including disease, famine, (sometimes premature) death, genocide, mass murder, political corruption, racism and ethnic hatred, fraud and theft, natural disasters, intense warfare, rape, child sexual abuse, and much more (not even including animal suffering), and so I take the amount of suffering and evil we see as evidence against theism. Regarding the amount of suffering under naturalism, you've said that "I still wouldn't expect anything as specific as pain. Instead, I'd expect sentience to be chaotic, epi-phenomenal (hence, no adaptive role), and entirely unrelated to any meaningful life-story." I understand the life story part (but, at the end of the day, the suffering we see in this world is not related to a life story either) but, regarding the other things, I'd like to know why you they are expected under naturalism; is it related to design arguments (like the FTA and evolutionary arguments) that, in your view, render the probability of embodied moral creatures under naturalism low?
5. Regarding death and disease (skipped past that one on accident lol): I agree that some danger and pain is needed under theism for the protection of the creatures in question and for the sake of some theoretical values mentioned earlier. But, a couple things should be said. Firstly, I don't see how disease is a necessary pain to go through; it never happens because of doing something virtuous in the same way that, say, pain felt in the gym does (like, no one does things that'll get them sick on purpose for the sake of theoretical virtues, except for maybe partying during covid, which you and I would agree isn't actually virtuous), and I don't see a reason why God would create a world with disease. Secondly, no amount of danger and pain felt in the ideal theistic world should be able to cause actual biological death, because biological death is absolutely not expected under theism if God loves his creatures; yet, in our world, it does. Thirdly, you've said that under theism you'd expect "everything bad to be able to work together for incomparably greater jewels of good", but this doesn't happen in a lot of cases; for example, what about athletes who are injured when they're young and can never pursue their goals and dreams in life ever again because of their injury? Sure, they might learn a lesson about pain and life from that, but that doesn't trump the pain of never being able to achieve a goal they loved so much.
6. Regarding non-belief: I agree that "on theism, I'd expect various paths *to* discovering more and more good things in the foundation of existence, with truth-seekers learning to love each other even while still in the face of deep disagreements". We don't see this precisely under theism (look at New Atheism) but that's not really an issue for theism, because of free will. Under naturalism, I don't see how this would be any different; and I'm curious as to why you would hold that "even if sentience did occur, I'd expect it to be almost entirely meaningless noise."
7. It should be understood that if you hold that the types of evil you mentioned above are probabilistically likely under theism, you would have to hold that they would be probabilistically likely to occur in the earthly paradise that God - by your theology - promises for the future and intended for humans. That means you would have to hold that it is at least probabilistically likely"mysterious evil", injustice, death and disease, the amount of suffering we see in the world today, and widespread non-belief will all be actualized in the future paradise and were all God's intention from the start. If you were to disaffirm this, you'd be saying that those things aren't likely under theism, thus forfeiting the argument.
Those are great thoughts, indeed. It would take some work to explore the roots of the differences in expectations. But 3 quick notes:
1. I don't share the intuition that egregious suffering (e.g., that scars them for life) doesn't also challenge people in ultimately positive ways. On the contrary, experience suggests to me that some of the deepest felt goods spring out of the deepest felt pains, and I don't see why that wouldn't apply to the most egregious cases of suffering. Also, the more specific the type of pain, the less likely it is on *any* theory.
2. I think it is a really interesting idea to build in "embodied moral creatures" into the background evidence. This is Draper's approach, and I see value in it. Indeed, I plan to make a separate post on Draper's argument eventually. For now I wish to simply note that my thesis that various evils are prima facie evidence against atheism is *fully compatible* with this other approach, and so I want to analyze it separately. (Maybe I can also add that I think that building in "embodied moral creatures" still doesn't give me the expectation that there would be any of the types of evil mentioned, since I have no reason to expect there to be more than a few moral creatures whose mental states aren't epi-phenomena or connected in meaningful psychological sequences with a narrative structure that might include conflicts of any such kinds.)
3. I also have a different view about the final suggestion that "if you hold that the types of evil are probabilistically likely under theism, you would have to hold that they would be probabilistically likely to occur in the earthly paradise that God." Instead, my thought is that I would expect these types of evil somewhere under theism, but NOT that I'd expect them everywhere. Compare: just because I would expect there to be a conflict in a great story does not imply that I would expect there to be a conflict in a celebration part of that story.
Great question. First, in my view, experience is essential for building out certain qualities in beings (including in God); it is impossible to build those qualities without certain experiences. Second, I also see value in the process of building great things, and there is value in us experiencing that value.
A month or so before my 15th birthday, I was bloodied and sprawled out next to my damaged bicycle. Smelling salts brought me back to some consciousness. Medic 1 (Seattle’s novel paramedic mobile response) had come to what may have been presumed to be a ‘hit a run’. Concerned crowd had gathered around, and despite it being a very warm day, and my having been pumping those pedals hard, I felt strangely comfortable and appreciated the blanket provided (body in shock). Days later, memory came back of a loose brake lever that fell into the front spokes, as I was moving at a fast clip.
Confined to the family couch for my wounds to heal, I had lots of time to reflect, sobered by my brush with possible death.
I had been raised in a pseudo-Christian cult, of which I wanted nothing to do with, by the time I was 12. And, I was wanting to reject about all their positions and posturings. So, for a couple of years I became a wannabe atheist of sorts. My adolescent mind was made.
But,... but, but, but,.... my analytical mind started pondering reality, suffering, anguish, meaning, etc. What later, I learned had been named ‘irreducible complexity’, challenged me that a mythical hydrogen explosion( as is the common origin story taught the young and credulous), could never produce what we have here and also the entire universe.
I determined that since there is in fact a creator, I had two possible characterizations.
Either this is all God’s cosmic joke, where we suffer for no benefit to us. Or,... there must be some redemption; God will fix it.
It took me another few years to make another big step to embracing the revealed Word.
But, for my mid-teens, I had become a hopeful deist.
Hi Josh! A friend of mine shared the following with me in response to your above post. I found them very insightful.
How might you respond to the insights below?
"Some thoughts:
1. I agree that "soul-developing experiences" that include "trials and uncertainties" are expected under theism. But, really, the only "evil" that would be expected given this is types that "challenge you", but don't actually cause egregious suffering; I'm talking about, say, the pain of working out (which brings about the theoretical values of discipline, courage, etc.), climbing a mountain, taking risks, etc. These activities cause pain, but that pain is (1) intentionally being inflicted by free-willed creatures on themselves with consent, and (2) not so egregious that it scars them for life. In that case, while the soul-developing theodicy works against some kinds of "evils" (I'm hesitant to really even call it that, if we define evil as "a state of affairs that (from an axiological standpoint) should not be taking place"), it doesn't work against the ones that are non-consensual and the ones people are particularly worried about (death, disease, famine, genocide, rape, etc.) You yourself agreed with this, I remember you saying in a call that you can't say that "it's good that that guy got hit in a car crash because he found God" because "that's terrible".
2. Regarding mysterious evil: I'm not sure what "mysterious evil" refers to, but I find "on non-theism, I'd expect no creatures to ever exist," to not actually solve the POE, though it is something very important to point out and argue for. I think we can agree on this though. So I think that it's best to go by the presupposition that embodied moral creatures exist under both worldviews when assessing these arguments, because if we don't go by that, it kind of removes the actual purpose - logically and emotionally - of the arguments.
3. Regarding injustice: I would definitely not expect injustice under theism, given that God loves his creatures and wants to build a state of affairs where they are happy, doing meaningful things, and having meaningful relationships with others. Injustice prevents this from occurring, and causes people to suffer and feel unsatisfied, mistreated, and undervalued in life. Under theism, it seems far more reasonable for their to be a world where all creatures get to live how they want to live, with adequate food, water, shelter, clothing, acquaintances, etc. Soul-developing does not justify a world where there is injustice, because you can already help others without injustice; for example, if someone is constructing a new house in the ideal theistic world, you can help them out with that, or you can give them advice on attracting a marriage mate, parenting, etc. (since those are still going to be problems given free will). As for injustice under naturalism, since there is no God governing the world (only humans), humans can mistreat eachother by spreading racism and hate for other groups of people, withholding resources from one another, etc. Under theism, given God's perfect rule, none of those things are probable.
4. Regarding the amount of suffering: I totally agree that "on theism, I'd expect the amounts of danger to be finely tuned for soul & relationship building experiences, for individuals, families, cities, nations, and species", but this is absolutely not what we see in the world; we see pretty egregious amounts of suffering and evil, including disease, famine, (sometimes premature) death, genocide, mass murder, political corruption, racism and ethnic hatred, fraud and theft, natural disasters, intense warfare, rape, child sexual abuse, and much more (not even including animal suffering), and so I take the amount of suffering and evil we see as evidence against theism. Regarding the amount of suffering under naturalism, you've said that "I still wouldn't expect anything as specific as pain. Instead, I'd expect sentience to be chaotic, epi-phenomenal (hence, no adaptive role), and entirely unrelated to any meaningful life-story." I understand the life story part (but, at the end of the day, the suffering we see in this world is not related to a life story either) but, regarding the other things, I'd like to know why you they are expected under naturalism; is it related to design arguments (like the FTA and evolutionary arguments) that, in your view, render the probability of embodied moral creatures under naturalism low?
5. Regarding death and disease (skipped past that one on accident lol): I agree that some danger and pain is needed under theism for the protection of the creatures in question and for the sake of some theoretical values mentioned earlier. But, a couple things should be said. Firstly, I don't see how disease is a necessary pain to go through; it never happens because of doing something virtuous in the same way that, say, pain felt in the gym does (like, no one does things that'll get them sick on purpose for the sake of theoretical virtues, except for maybe partying during covid, which you and I would agree isn't actually virtuous), and I don't see a reason why God would create a world with disease. Secondly, no amount of danger and pain felt in the ideal theistic world should be able to cause actual biological death, because biological death is absolutely not expected under theism if God loves his creatures; yet, in our world, it does. Thirdly, you've said that under theism you'd expect "everything bad to be able to work together for incomparably greater jewels of good", but this doesn't happen in a lot of cases; for example, what about athletes who are injured when they're young and can never pursue their goals and dreams in life ever again because of their injury? Sure, they might learn a lesson about pain and life from that, but that doesn't trump the pain of never being able to achieve a goal they loved so much.
6. Regarding non-belief: I agree that "on theism, I'd expect various paths *to* discovering more and more good things in the foundation of existence, with truth-seekers learning to love each other even while still in the face of deep disagreements". We don't see this precisely under theism (look at New Atheism) but that's not really an issue for theism, because of free will. Under naturalism, I don't see how this would be any different; and I'm curious as to why you would hold that "even if sentience did occur, I'd expect it to be almost entirely meaningless noise."
7. It should be understood that if you hold that the types of evil you mentioned above are probabilistically likely under theism, you would have to hold that they would be probabilistically likely to occur in the earthly paradise that God - by your theology - promises for the future and intended for humans. That means you would have to hold that it is at least probabilistically likely"mysterious evil", injustice, death and disease, the amount of suffering we see in the world today, and widespread non-belief will all be actualized in the future paradise and were all God's intention from the start. If you were to disaffirm this, you'd be saying that those things aren't likely under theism, thus forfeiting the argument.
Those are my thoughts though."
Those are great thoughts, indeed. It would take some work to explore the roots of the differences in expectations. But 3 quick notes:
1. I don't share the intuition that egregious suffering (e.g., that scars them for life) doesn't also challenge people in ultimately positive ways. On the contrary, experience suggests to me that some of the deepest felt goods spring out of the deepest felt pains, and I don't see why that wouldn't apply to the most egregious cases of suffering. Also, the more specific the type of pain, the less likely it is on *any* theory.
2. I think it is a really interesting idea to build in "embodied moral creatures" into the background evidence. This is Draper's approach, and I see value in it. Indeed, I plan to make a separate post on Draper's argument eventually. For now I wish to simply note that my thesis that various evils are prima facie evidence against atheism is *fully compatible* with this other approach, and so I want to analyze it separately. (Maybe I can also add that I think that building in "embodied moral creatures" still doesn't give me the expectation that there would be any of the types of evil mentioned, since I have no reason to expect there to be more than a few moral creatures whose mental states aren't epi-phenomena or connected in meaningful psychological sequences with a narrative structure that might include conflicts of any such kinds.)
3. I also have a different view about the final suggestion that "if you hold that the types of evil are probabilistically likely under theism, you would have to hold that they would be probabilistically likely to occur in the earthly paradise that God." Instead, my thought is that I would expect these types of evil somewhere under theism, but NOT that I'd expect them everywhere. Compare: just because I would expect there to be a conflict in a great story does not imply that I would expect there to be a conflict in a celebration part of that story.
Why would God ever need to focus on soul-building when he can create agents with all the experiences you need for any situation ever?
Great question. First, in my view, experience is essential for building out certain qualities in beings (including in God); it is impossible to build those qualities without certain experiences. Second, I also see value in the process of building great things, and there is value in us experiencing that value.
Great observation, think I will use it in my Ethics class- with citation to the prime mover of the idea of course
A month or so before my 15th birthday, I was bloodied and sprawled out next to my damaged bicycle. Smelling salts brought me back to some consciousness. Medic 1 (Seattle’s novel paramedic mobile response) had come to what may have been presumed to be a ‘hit a run’. Concerned crowd had gathered around, and despite it being a very warm day, and my having been pumping those pedals hard, I felt strangely comfortable and appreciated the blanket provided (body in shock). Days later, memory came back of a loose brake lever that fell into the front spokes, as I was moving at a fast clip.
Confined to the family couch for my wounds to heal, I had lots of time to reflect, sobered by my brush with possible death.
I had been raised in a pseudo-Christian cult, of which I wanted nothing to do with, by the time I was 12. And, I was wanting to reject about all their positions and posturings. So, for a couple of years I became a wannabe atheist of sorts. My adolescent mind was made.
But,... but, but, but,.... my analytical mind started pondering reality, suffering, anguish, meaning, etc. What later, I learned had been named ‘irreducible complexity’, challenged me that a mythical hydrogen explosion( as is the common origin story taught the young and credulous), could never produce what we have here and also the entire universe.
I determined that since there is in fact a creator, I had two possible characterizations.
Either this is all God’s cosmic joke, where we suffer for no benefit to us. Or,... there must be some redemption; God will fix it.
It took me another few years to make another big step to embracing the revealed Word.
But, for my mid-teens, I had become a hopeful deist.
There must be some redemption!!!!