But notice the problem is created by a spatial metaphor. When you first pose the dilemma, the options are that truth "doesn't depend on" or "depends on" perspective. But then when you problematize the first option, you say you only have access to that which is "within" your perspective, suggesting that objective truth is "outside" your perspective. You've then established a metaphor in which perspective is a container with some things in it, and some things outside of it, a perfect dichotomy. It seems to me one solution to the problem is to reject this metaphor. Don't get me wrong, it is a very natural metaphor, and we use such spatial metaphors to reason about many things. But whereas inside/outside is a perfect dichotomy, perspective often doesn't work that way. An image can be fuzzier or clearer. A sound can be more or less distinct. Feelings can creep up on you gradually. These are all examples of how things are not perfectly inside or outside our "perspective."
Besides, I think one has to accept that our perspective is an imperfect tool for getting to the truth. Do I know nothing? Well, Socrates said that admitting that was the first step to wisdom, and I think that in a profound sense he was right. I suppose the belief that there is "objective" truth is a statement of faith, rather than a conclusion I can ever be supremely confident in.
The paradox rests on a hidden assumption: that genuine access to truth requires stepping outside your perspective entirely. But why think that? A thermometer doesn’t need a God’s-eye view to accurately register temperature. Its constitution reliably tracks an objective fact. Similarly, our cognitive faculties track objective truths from within a perspective. The perspective is the medium of access, not a barrier to it.
You don’t have “direct” access to (most) truths, as most truths are indeed independent of your perspective. But that needn’t mean you don’t have knowledge, as indirect access (trusting your perspective, even though it could be wrong) can be enough for justification, at least on reflection.
Is an elephant still an elephant if I call it a zebra? Just because I call an elephant a zebra, doesn’t mean the elephant turns into a zebra. It’s “elephantness” exists objectively.
Several distinctions/off-ramps that spring to mind:
1) What "perspective" means seems underdetermined within the (brief) thought experiment.
2) It seems that the particular formulation is not exhaustive: for example, if perspective depends on a relation between self and observed, this relation is in one way independent, in another way not independent. (This is another way to develop 1)
3) To take the particular example given of memory, one could deny knowledge consists of memory, though it might require remembering (e.g. the Meno).
4) One could also distinguish between objects of knowledge. Perhaps some things are independent by nature, whereas others are essentially related. Thus, my name depends on me insofar as it names me. The relation in 1 would not obtain between my parents and myself should I, a knower, not exist. But this is not a dependence on perspective as something perceived by me would have: it depends on me even when I do not perceive it (as an infant). Likewise, a name tells things about me or expresses things about me which I do not perceive in the same manner as other truths or even other names (e.g. the difference between "scientific" truths, "historical" truths, and "news" as Walker Percy puts it). My own name even carries the possibility of being changed - divinely or legally.
5) The actual question of how I know my name: the simple answer is that the people who gave it to me told me (so we ask the question -- how do I know -- not on the basis of memory at all, but on the primary principle of origin). Memory doesn't answer how I came to know my name (3).
6) The Socratic possibility that there is an awareness of essentially non-sensible (and therefore, so to speak, non-perceived -- except analogically) things. (Distinction between perception and understanding/noesis). (This is also 3 if one says memory is essentially a kind of sense-perception, which seems not all that improbable).
Well written! I think you capture the tension will between our desire to know truth and our limited minds. I'm happy to take option 1 and say that the wholeness of truth is beyond what I can grasp in my limited perspective but that doesn't mean that what I grasp is not objective. I can grab a desk, for example, without grabbing the whole of the desk from every angle. Or see a car without seeing all sides at once. I can know my name, but not know why my parents chose it or it's etymology etc.
As for the claim “You only access what is within your perspective”, it is ambiguous. It means either: “truth depends on your perspective,” in which case the reasoning against option 1 simply begs the question; or it means something much weaker, such as: “whenever you know anything, it is you who knows it.” But in that case, option 1 remains untouched. Of course, when you know something objective, it is you, this particular subject, who knows it rather than some other individual subject. But, that does not show what you require i.e., that what is known is perspective-dependent.
I think one crude way to solve the access problem (the first horn) is to rely on the uniformity of experience but this raises problems vis-a-vis the sensual apprehension of the world.
1. If the world's contents are ran by sensual filters that strip their originality, then we do not access reality in itself but an "apparition" or projection of it.
2. We cannot know if uniform experience = the same world beyond sensual projection. For all that is possible, there exists the variable that distinct facts of objective reality are projected the same way on the senses.
We can place our bets in believing that the world is perceived equally (at least this is largely the case) and then say the truths that can be known are the truths that are the result of objective reality colliding with our senses. To explain my "jargon", I'll use colour as an example. We all perceive colour equally to a degree. We could disagree on what type of red a red cloth is but we converge on the perception of a redness, when all else are equal. The obvious truth is that when the intricate facts about the cloth in relation to light are apprehended by the intricacies of our senses, they produce redness; thus, we can say we have access to one non-perspectival truth about the cloth. Perhaps, it is the case that there are objective truths that can be accessed by consensus or shared subjectivity.
This is the same sleigh of hand that Francis Schaeffer and Cornelius Van Til were trying to pull over 50 years ago. This only works if we define ‘know’ as having absolute certainty, which is ultimately an impossible standard of knowledge dreamed up by Enlightenment philosophers.
Imagine for a moment a normal, functional human eyeball that is free-floating. Every time it is shown a light wave that constitutes the color red, the eyeball perceives red. When shown blue, it perceives blue. White, white, and so on.
Now, it may be the case that the eyeball can never perceive itself receiving the information that the object is whatever color, but it remains from the outside looking in that the eyeball perceives the color accurately. It doesn't need to look at its own retina to validate its vision, it processes information its receiving that isn't internal to it.
It seems to me, reason is a lot like that eyeball. Reason unlocks the door to truths available to your perspective but not internal to it, just as the light waves are external to the eye but available to it. In the same way you may think its nonsensical to talk about the lightwaves being internal to the eyeball, it would also be the case under this view it is nonsensical to say reason can come to any conclusions without external information.
Now, now, now. I’m going to make everyone happy and upset with me and not assert a proposition without defending it. So here we go, the "boring" part that's already been said thousands of times.
The proposition is this:
"Reason lets us see truths outside of our evaluating perspective."
What is the negation of that?
"Reason does not let us see truths outside of our evaluating perspective."
But notice the trap: to declare that negation as a factual reality requires the skeptic to use reason to grasp a structural truth outside their own evaluating perspective. They have to climb on top of the wall to declare the wall is impassable. The statement itself relies on the very cosmic, objective reach of reason that it is trying to deny. It is a performative contradiction; the skeptic cannot even articulate their position without dismantling it.
If the skeptic tries to escape this trap by claiming a false dichotomy.. retreating into subjectivism and saying, "Well, internal truths are sufficient, and my skepticism is only true 'qua me'", they have still surrendered.
The moment a claim is only "true qua me," the speaker is no longer making a claim about reality, about the paradox, or about anyone else's mind. They are merely reporting a private weather condition inside their own head. If they say, "Reason is a wall qua me," I can simply say, "Reason is a window qua me." By abandoning objective ground, they lose the logical foothold to disagree, afterall how could they ever verify it is not in fact a window qua me? Furthermore, to claim it is a stable, structural fact that their perspective is limited still constructs an objective law about their internal reality. To demonstrate this, we go back to the eye example, there is no way for the eye to know that it does indeed process or not process lightwaves external to it without looking at the kind the eye is. Objectivity always slips back in through the back door through making even the claim that "qua me, reason is a wall."
Therefore, the real dichotomy stands:
"Reason is a window to external truths"
Or
"We can know nothing, we can say nothing to anyone else, and nothing matters, not even this statement."
If someone chooses the second option, they have to abandon the game of rational thought entirely and retreat into total, silent cognitive nihilism.
This is a nice way to state a classic problem.
But notice the problem is created by a spatial metaphor. When you first pose the dilemma, the options are that truth "doesn't depend on" or "depends on" perspective. But then when you problematize the first option, you say you only have access to that which is "within" your perspective, suggesting that objective truth is "outside" your perspective. You've then established a metaphor in which perspective is a container with some things in it, and some things outside of it, a perfect dichotomy. It seems to me one solution to the problem is to reject this metaphor. Don't get me wrong, it is a very natural metaphor, and we use such spatial metaphors to reason about many things. But whereas inside/outside is a perfect dichotomy, perspective often doesn't work that way. An image can be fuzzier or clearer. A sound can be more or less distinct. Feelings can creep up on you gradually. These are all examples of how things are not perfectly inside or outside our "perspective."
Besides, I think one has to accept that our perspective is an imperfect tool for getting to the truth. Do I know nothing? Well, Socrates said that admitting that was the first step to wisdom, and I think that in a profound sense he was right. I suppose the belief that there is "objective" truth is a statement of faith, rather than a conclusion I can ever be supremely confident in.
It seems that truth can be objective but our knowledge of truth can only be subjective.
The paradox rests on a hidden assumption: that genuine access to truth requires stepping outside your perspective entirely. But why think that? A thermometer doesn’t need a God’s-eye view to accurately register temperature. Its constitution reliably tracks an objective fact. Similarly, our cognitive faculties track objective truths from within a perspective. The perspective is the medium of access, not a barrier to it.
Yeah I just don’t get why our lack of an absolute perspective of reality inhibits our ability to ascertain objective truths.
You don’t have “direct” access to (most) truths, as most truths are indeed independent of your perspective. But that needn’t mean you don’t have knowledge, as indirect access (trusting your perspective, even though it could be wrong) can be enough for justification, at least on reflection.
Agreed.
Is an elephant still an elephant if I call it a zebra? Just because I call an elephant a zebra, doesn’t mean the elephant turns into a zebra. It’s “elephantness” exists objectively.
Very Socratic question!
Several distinctions/off-ramps that spring to mind:
1) What "perspective" means seems underdetermined within the (brief) thought experiment.
2) It seems that the particular formulation is not exhaustive: for example, if perspective depends on a relation between self and observed, this relation is in one way independent, in another way not independent. (This is another way to develop 1)
3) To take the particular example given of memory, one could deny knowledge consists of memory, though it might require remembering (e.g. the Meno).
4) One could also distinguish between objects of knowledge. Perhaps some things are independent by nature, whereas others are essentially related. Thus, my name depends on me insofar as it names me. The relation in 1 would not obtain between my parents and myself should I, a knower, not exist. But this is not a dependence on perspective as something perceived by me would have: it depends on me even when I do not perceive it (as an infant). Likewise, a name tells things about me or expresses things about me which I do not perceive in the same manner as other truths or even other names (e.g. the difference between "scientific" truths, "historical" truths, and "news" as Walker Percy puts it). My own name even carries the possibility of being changed - divinely or legally.
5) The actual question of how I know my name: the simple answer is that the people who gave it to me told me (so we ask the question -- how do I know -- not on the basis of memory at all, but on the primary principle of origin). Memory doesn't answer how I came to know my name (3).
6) The Socratic possibility that there is an awareness of essentially non-sensible (and therefore, so to speak, non-perceived -- except analogically) things. (Distinction between perception and understanding/noesis). (This is also 3 if one says memory is essentially a kind of sense-perception, which seems not all that improbable).
Well written! I think you capture the tension will between our desire to know truth and our limited minds. I'm happy to take option 1 and say that the wholeness of truth is beyond what I can grasp in my limited perspective but that doesn't mean that what I grasp is not objective. I can grab a desk, for example, without grabbing the whole of the desk from every angle. Or see a car without seeing all sides at once. I can know my name, but not know why my parents chose it or it's etymology etc.
I’ll go with option 1.
As for the claim “You only access what is within your perspective”, it is ambiguous. It means either: “truth depends on your perspective,” in which case the reasoning against option 1 simply begs the question; or it means something much weaker, such as: “whenever you know anything, it is you who knows it.” But in that case, option 1 remains untouched. Of course, when you know something objective, it is you, this particular subject, who knows it rather than some other individual subject. But, that does not show what you require i.e., that what is known is perspective-dependent.
I think one crude way to solve the access problem (the first horn) is to rely on the uniformity of experience but this raises problems vis-a-vis the sensual apprehension of the world.
1. If the world's contents are ran by sensual filters that strip their originality, then we do not access reality in itself but an "apparition" or projection of it.
2. We cannot know if uniform experience = the same world beyond sensual projection. For all that is possible, there exists the variable that distinct facts of objective reality are projected the same way on the senses.
We can place our bets in believing that the world is perceived equally (at least this is largely the case) and then say the truths that can be known are the truths that are the result of objective reality colliding with our senses. To explain my "jargon", I'll use colour as an example. We all perceive colour equally to a degree. We could disagree on what type of red a red cloth is but we converge on the perception of a redness, when all else are equal. The obvious truth is that when the intricate facts about the cloth in relation to light are apprehended by the intricacies of our senses, they produce redness; thus, we can say we have access to one non-perspectival truth about the cloth. Perhaps, it is the case that there are objective truths that can be accessed by consensus or shared subjectivity.
This is the same sleigh of hand that Francis Schaeffer and Cornelius Van Til were trying to pull over 50 years ago. This only works if we define ‘know’ as having absolute certainty, which is ultimately an impossible standard of knowledge dreamed up by Enlightenment philosophers.
Imagine for a moment a normal, functional human eyeball that is free-floating. Every time it is shown a light wave that constitutes the color red, the eyeball perceives red. When shown blue, it perceives blue. White, white, and so on.
Now, it may be the case that the eyeball can never perceive itself receiving the information that the object is whatever color, but it remains from the outside looking in that the eyeball perceives the color accurately. It doesn't need to look at its own retina to validate its vision, it processes information its receiving that isn't internal to it.
It seems to me, reason is a lot like that eyeball. Reason unlocks the door to truths available to your perspective but not internal to it, just as the light waves are external to the eye but available to it. In the same way you may think its nonsensical to talk about the lightwaves being internal to the eyeball, it would also be the case under this view it is nonsensical to say reason can come to any conclusions without external information.
Now, now, now. I’m going to make everyone happy and upset with me and not assert a proposition without defending it. So here we go, the "boring" part that's already been said thousands of times.
The proposition is this:
"Reason lets us see truths outside of our evaluating perspective."
What is the negation of that?
"Reason does not let us see truths outside of our evaluating perspective."
But notice the trap: to declare that negation as a factual reality requires the skeptic to use reason to grasp a structural truth outside their own evaluating perspective. They have to climb on top of the wall to declare the wall is impassable. The statement itself relies on the very cosmic, objective reach of reason that it is trying to deny. It is a performative contradiction; the skeptic cannot even articulate their position without dismantling it.
If the skeptic tries to escape this trap by claiming a false dichotomy.. retreating into subjectivism and saying, "Well, internal truths are sufficient, and my skepticism is only true 'qua me'", they have still surrendered.
The moment a claim is only "true qua me," the speaker is no longer making a claim about reality, about the paradox, or about anyone else's mind. They are merely reporting a private weather condition inside their own head. If they say, "Reason is a wall qua me," I can simply say, "Reason is a window qua me." By abandoning objective ground, they lose the logical foothold to disagree, afterall how could they ever verify it is not in fact a window qua me? Furthermore, to claim it is a stable, structural fact that their perspective is limited still constructs an objective law about their internal reality. To demonstrate this, we go back to the eye example, there is no way for the eye to know that it does indeed process or not process lightwaves external to it without looking at the kind the eye is. Objectivity always slips back in through the back door through making even the claim that "qua me, reason is a wall."
Therefore, the real dichotomy stands:
"Reason is a window to external truths"
Or
"We can know nothing, we can say nothing to anyone else, and nothing matters, not even this statement."
If someone chooses the second option, they have to abandon the game of rational thought entirely and retreat into total, silent cognitive nihilism.
A much more difficult pill to swallow.