Re: Q6, I think this is my key objection to almost all modern (i.e., modal logic-aware) versions of the ontological argument.
If (necessary existence as a property of the concept of something => it exists in every universe or none of them) then it should be self-contradictory for there to be, say, a world with nothing in it. Perhaps it is, but it seems implausible without further work. When I take a reversal test, I can also easily imagine a world with a supremely wise, kind, powerful, eternal being with no contradiction either - which I assume is the basis for "perfection is probably possible" - except if we add in the rider that this being is Anselmian and thus exists in every other world also.
So if there is a possible world with nothing in it, then there is no being in every possible world, which means there is no necessarily existent being (which does not mean there might not be weaker omnimax deities.)
The contradiction may not be explicit. E.g., <there is nothing> entails <it is true that there is nothing> entails <there is something true> entails <there is something>...
Dude, I love you. You are such a wonderful philosopher and person!
Göing Deeper
Re: Q6, I think this is my key objection to almost all modern (i.e., modal logic-aware) versions of the ontological argument.
If (necessary existence as a property of the concept of something => it exists in every universe or none of them) then it should be self-contradictory for there to be, say, a world with nothing in it. Perhaps it is, but it seems implausible without further work. When I take a reversal test, I can also easily imagine a world with a supremely wise, kind, powerful, eternal being with no contradiction either - which I assume is the basis for "perfection is probably possible" - except if we add in the rider that this being is Anselmian and thus exists in every other world also.
So if there is a possible world with nothing in it, then there is no being in every possible world, which means there is no necessarily existent being (which does not mean there might not be weaker omnimax deities.)
The contradiction may not be explicit. E.g., <there is nothing> entails <it is true that there is nothing> entails <there is something true> entails <there is something>...