1. Many Theists are committed to a view of evil that sees evil as an extrinsic feature, like the privation or rearrangement theories of evil. So, maybe the evil of an action is not preserved when you rearrange.
2. There might be some theories of evil that preclude pointless suffering in principle. I need to do more research on this point.
3. We could amend the principle so that if there is a necessary being with the power and inclination to prevent something, then we cannot rearrange to get that. Here some reasons to not think that this is ad hoc: I. The being in necessary, meaning it spans all possible worlds. This would ensure that it's effects would span across all possible worlds, and so it limits the scope of possibility through its necessity. II. If we construe this being to be the source of all other things, and possibility is defined in terms of causal power, then it just follows that if the being can't produce the effect, then it's not possible. Thoughts: https://robkoons.net/the-rigorous-thomist/defending-the-grim-reaper
4. We can change our principle to natures rather than intrinsic properties. So, we could then say that suffering isn't really an object with a nature, so we don't have to worry about it. But, we could create the paradox by saying there's an object with a specific nature that requires it to perform the action when it exists at a particular time, and an object of that nature exists for each day of an infinite past.
5. Maybe you can't change the individual intrinsic states to that much required by the argument to get off the ground. So, they are independent but that doesn't mean you can change them individually.
About just denying the contradiction:
It seems like it would be similar to someone denying a thought experiment is possible that would create a problem in their moral theory. They would just deny the thought experiment is possible because it creates a problem for their moral theory. But, we use thought experiments in a wide range of applications all the time. If we accepted that principle, then thought experiments would not help in an argument. So, this principle contradicts the widespread use of thought experiments in other domains.
As for modal theory, I think it can help to distinguish between the ground of possibility and the ground of our knowledge of possibility. I grant the modal theory that grounds possibility in terms of causal capacities of a foundational, necessary reality. But that's consistent with having modal intuitions that grounds one's knowledge of the recombination principle.
To avoid unnecessary controversy over modal theories, we could also simply stipulate that the notion of "possibility" will cover any state that doesn't entail a contradiction (consistent with reason). That's all we need to run the argument.
Interesting. That does seem a way to get around these objections. I remember you saying in a video that we can just say an infinite causal past is impossible through logical recombination, but I'm not exactly sure what you mean by logical recombination.
Thanks for those thoughts! About the contradiction, I think it's different if one has independently motivated premises that, together with a certain moral theory, *entail* a contradiction. Then the motivation for the premises is motivation against the moral theory (granting that motivation for the moral theory is also motivation against the premises).
How do you get from a finite history (which you defined in causal, not temporal terms) to a finite past (the name of this post)? Is it just an argument for a finite causal past?
I hope you're doing well. I have a question regarding the concept of God’s will and consciousness. If God has consciousness and mental events, wouldn’t one mental event precede another, implying a sequence that requires time? Specifically, if God wills the creation of the cosmos not from eternity but at a specific moment in time, wouldn’t this mean He has to "wait" for an infinite amount of time for that moment to arrive, considering God’s eternal nature? This seems to lead to a form of the Grim Reaper Paradox affecting God’s mental events.
Al-Ghazali attempts to resolve this by arguing that God’s will is eternal while its effects occur in time. He gives the example of talaq (divorce) in Islamic theology: if a husband wills to divorce his wife when he enters his house, the will is prior, but the divorce will not take effect until the condition—his entering the house—is fulfilled. Here, time is measured by observable changes, such as the movement of the sun. However, in the case of God, who is eternal, what standard or measure determines the specific moment for the effect of His eternal will to manifest? If time itself requires change, how does God, who is timeless, fix the time for the temporal origination of the cosmos?
You might find Allama Iqbal’s critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument relevant here. You can explore it further on Hasnain’s post: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/15i39gkY37/
I’m still trying to wrap my mind around the PII, so I may be missing something. But to me it seems like a reasonable person could *either* accept causal finitism *or* regard cases like the infinite collection of clocks with randomized times as counterexamples to PII. It seems like a friend of the infinite could adopt a limited PII that says something like “for any objects, their intrinsic properties do not necessarily change merely by changing the intrinsic properties of other objects *unless* the changing of the intrinsic properties of other objects would otherwise create a contradiction.” That doesn’t strike me as a particularly arbitrary limitation on the scope of PII.
Sounds reasonable. I guess it will depend how evident PII strikes someone. For comparison, consider the principle of double negation: ~~P entails P. Now suppose someone thinks that ~~~P and P is impossible because by double negation it entails a contradiction. Someone else could reply that perhaps we should restrict double negation so that it only applies in cases that *don't* create a contradiction. This reply would be reasonable if they don't find double negation evident in its general form, like the person who doesn't find PII evident in its general form.. For my part, I find both evident in their general form.
Some thoughts about the theistic objections:
1. Many Theists are committed to a view of evil that sees evil as an extrinsic feature, like the privation or rearrangement theories of evil. So, maybe the evil of an action is not preserved when you rearrange.
2. There might be some theories of evil that preclude pointless suffering in principle. I need to do more research on this point.
3. We could amend the principle so that if there is a necessary being with the power and inclination to prevent something, then we cannot rearrange to get that. Here some reasons to not think that this is ad hoc: I. The being in necessary, meaning it spans all possible worlds. This would ensure that it's effects would span across all possible worlds, and so it limits the scope of possibility through its necessity. II. If we construe this being to be the source of all other things, and possibility is defined in terms of causal power, then it just follows that if the being can't produce the effect, then it's not possible. Thoughts: https://robkoons.net/the-rigorous-thomist/defending-the-grim-reaper
4. We can change our principle to natures rather than intrinsic properties. So, we could then say that suffering isn't really an object with a nature, so we don't have to worry about it. But, we could create the paradox by saying there's an object with a specific nature that requires it to perform the action when it exists at a particular time, and an object of that nature exists for each day of an infinite past.
5. Maybe you can't change the individual intrinsic states to that much required by the argument to get off the ground. So, they are independent but that doesn't mean you can change them individually.
About just denying the contradiction:
It seems like it would be similar to someone denying a thought experiment is possible that would create a problem in their moral theory. They would just deny the thought experiment is possible because it creates a problem for their moral theory. But, we use thought experiments in a wide range of applications all the time. If we accepted that principle, then thought experiments would not help in an argument. So, this principle contradicts the widespread use of thought experiments in other domains.
As for modal theory, I think it can help to distinguish between the ground of possibility and the ground of our knowledge of possibility. I grant the modal theory that grounds possibility in terms of causal capacities of a foundational, necessary reality. But that's consistent with having modal intuitions that grounds one's knowledge of the recombination principle.
To avoid unnecessary controversy over modal theories, we could also simply stipulate that the notion of "possibility" will cover any state that doesn't entail a contradiction (consistent with reason). That's all we need to run the argument.
Interesting. That does seem a way to get around these objections. I remember you saying in a video that we can just say an infinite causal past is impossible through logical recombination, but I'm not exactly sure what you mean by logical recombination.
Thanks for those thoughts! About the contradiction, I think it's different if one has independently motivated premises that, together with a certain moral theory, *entail* a contradiction. Then the motivation for the premises is motivation against the moral theory (granting that motivation for the moral theory is also motivation against the premises).
How do you get from a finite history (which you defined in causal, not temporal terms) to a finite past (the name of this post)? Is it just an argument for a finite causal past?
Sharp question. Yes, I meant just to focus on a finite, causal past, which leaves open an infinite, non-causal past.
Hello Sir,
I hope you're doing well. I have a question regarding the concept of God’s will and consciousness. If God has consciousness and mental events, wouldn’t one mental event precede another, implying a sequence that requires time? Specifically, if God wills the creation of the cosmos not from eternity but at a specific moment in time, wouldn’t this mean He has to "wait" for an infinite amount of time for that moment to arrive, considering God’s eternal nature? This seems to lead to a form of the Grim Reaper Paradox affecting God’s mental events.
Al-Ghazali attempts to resolve this by arguing that God’s will is eternal while its effects occur in time. He gives the example of talaq (divorce) in Islamic theology: if a husband wills to divorce his wife when he enters his house, the will is prior, but the divorce will not take effect until the condition—his entering the house—is fulfilled. Here, time is measured by observable changes, such as the movement of the sun. However, in the case of God, who is eternal, what standard or measure determines the specific moment for the effect of His eternal will to manifest? If time itself requires change, how does God, who is timeless, fix the time for the temporal origination of the cosmos?
You might find Allama Iqbal’s critique of the Kalam Cosmological Argument relevant here. You can explore it further on Hasnain’s post: https://www.facebook.com/share/p/15i39gkY37/
Looking forward to your thoughts!
You are probably aware of Joe schmids recent papers on the grim reaper right? What do you think of them? Does this weaken your case in your opinion?
I’m still trying to wrap my mind around the PII, so I may be missing something. But to me it seems like a reasonable person could *either* accept causal finitism *or* regard cases like the infinite collection of clocks with randomized times as counterexamples to PII. It seems like a friend of the infinite could adopt a limited PII that says something like “for any objects, their intrinsic properties do not necessarily change merely by changing the intrinsic properties of other objects *unless* the changing of the intrinsic properties of other objects would otherwise create a contradiction.” That doesn’t strike me as a particularly arbitrary limitation on the scope of PII.
Sounds reasonable. I guess it will depend how evident PII strikes someone. For comparison, consider the principle of double negation: ~~P entails P. Now suppose someone thinks that ~~~P and P is impossible because by double negation it entails a contradiction. Someone else could reply that perhaps we should restrict double negation so that it only applies in cases that *don't* create a contradiction. This reply would be reasonable if they don't find double negation evident in its general form, like the person who doesn't find PII evident in its general form.. For my part, I find both evident in their general form.